Explanation:

Policy-Based Forwarding (PBF) allows you to override the routing table and force traffic to take a specific path based on:

Source/Destination IP/Port
Application/Protocol (e.g., FTP)
ToS (Type of Service) field

Why These Answers Are Correct:
A: PBF can route specific traffic (e.g., FTP) to a backup ISP to conserve bandwidth on the primary link.
B: If the primary ISP fails, PBF can redirect traffic to a secondary circuit for failover.

Why the Others Are Incorrect:
C: PBF does not bypass Layer 7 inspection (App-ID/Content-ID still apply).
D: PBF can forward traffic based on source port, but this is not a typical use case (usually based on application, destination, or failover needs).

Reference:
Palo Alto PBF Documentation

Explanation:

Application Override allows administrators to force the firewall to treat traffic as a specific application, bypassing App-ID if necessary. This is useful when:

The firewall misidentifies an application.
An application uses non-standard ports.

Why These Answers Are Correct:

B. Application Override Policy Rule
Defines which traffic should be reclassified as a different application.

Requires:
Original application (e.g., ssl)
Override application (e.g., facebook-base)
Source/destination criteria.

C. Security Policy Rule
Must allow the traffic (either the original or overridden application).
Without a security rule permitting the traffic, it will still be blocked.

Why the Others Are Incorrect:
A. Application Filter → Used for monitoring/reporting, not overriding.
D. Custom App → Not required unless you’re creating a new application (not overriding an existing one).

Reference:
Palo Alto Application Override Docs

Explanation:

In a Palo Alto Networks SSL Forward Proxy decryption setup, there are three important certificate components involved:

1. Self-signed Root CA Certificate – Used to sign all forward trust and forward untrust certificates.
2. Forward Trust Certificate – Used by the firewall to sign certificates for trusted sites that it intercepts and decrypts.
3. Forward Untrust Certificate – Used by the firewall to sign certificates for untrusted sites.

To avoid browser warnings during decryption:

Clients must trust the root CA certificate.
The forward trust and forward untrust certificates must be signed by the root CA certificate.

In the scenario:

The administrator installed the self-signed root CA in all clients — ✔️ correct step.
But users are still receiving warnings when visiting SSL sites — 🚫 problem.

The most likely cause is that the firewall is using a forward trust certificate that is not signed by the root CA, so browsers don’t recognize the certificate chain and display "unsecured website" warnings.

❌ Why the other options are incorrect:

A. The forward untrust certificate doesn’t need to be trusted by clients because it’s meant to signal untrusted sites. This wouldn’t cause warnings for all sites.
B. Clients don’t need the forward trust certificate installed — they just need to trust the root CA that signed it.
C. Having the same CN on multiple certificates isn’t recommended but won’t directly cause SSL warnings unless there's a trust chain issue.

🔍 Reference:

Palo Alto Networks Documentation:
Configure SSL Forward Proxy
Generate a Certificate

Explanation:

Palo Alto firewalls support multi-factor authentication (MFA) for secure admin and user access. The three supported MFA methods are:

C. SMS – The firewall can integrate with SMS-based authentication services (e.g., Duo, Okta) to send verification codes.
D. User certificate – Digital certificates (e.g., X.509) can be used as a second factor alongside passwords.
E. One-time password (OTP) – Time-based OTPs (TOTP) from apps like Google Authenticator or RSA SecurID are supported.

Why the Others Are Incorrect:

A. Voice – Not a supported MFA method on Palo Alto firewalls.
B. Fingerprint – Biometric authentication is not natively supported for firewall access.

Reference:

Palo Alto MFA Documentation

Explanation:

When local overrides exist on a firewall, but you want all configurations to be managed strictly from Panorama, the best solution is to:

Use Panorama’s "Force Template Values" option – This overwrites any local interface (or template-pushed) configurations on the firewall, ensuring Panorama’s settings take precedence.

Prevents future local overrides – Ensures the firewall adheres only to Panorama-managed configurations.

Why the Other Options Are Incorrect:
A. commit force (CLI) – Only forces a commit if there are validation warnings but does not remove local overrides.
C. "Include Device and Network Templates" – Pushes configurations but does not enforce Panorama’s settings over local changes.
D. Reloading running config – This does not address the root issue (local overrides persist).

Reference:
Panorama Force Template Values Documentation

Explanation:

Cisco TrustSec technology uses Security Group Tags (SGTs) to enforce access controls on Layer 2 traffic. When implementing Zone Protection on a Palo Alto Networks firewall in an environment with Cisco TrustSec, you should configure Ethernet SGT Protection. This setting ensures that the firewall can recognize SGTs in Ethernet frames and apply the appropriate actions based on the configured policies.

The use of Ethernet SGT Protection in conjunction with TrustSec is covered in advanced firewall configuration documentation and in interoperability guides between Palo Alto Networks and Cisco systems.

Explanation:

To properly implement URL Filtering with override actions, the firewall must inspect encrypted (HTTPS) traffic. This requires:

A. SSL/TLS Service Profile
Defines which SSL/TLS versions and cipher suites are allowed.
Ensures the firewall can properly decrypt and inspect traffic.

C. Decryption Profile
Specifies decryption rules (e.g., forward trust, forward untrust).
Required for SSL decryption, which is necessary for URL Filtering to analyze HTTPS traffic.

Why the Others Are Incorrect:
B. HTTP Server Profile → Used for firewall management access (GUI/API), not URL Filtering.
D. Interface Management Profile → Controls management access to interfaces, unrelated to decryption.

Reference:
Palo Alto URL Filtering with Decryption

Explanation:

When planning SSL decryption, there are cases where certain websites cannot be decrypted due to technical limitations, such as:

Use of unsupported ciphers
Use of client certificate authentication
Certificate pinning
Forward secrecy algorithms that the firewall doesn't support

If the firewall tries to decrypt these sessions and fails, it will block the traffic (since it can't inspect it). This could impact business productivity if the sites are legitimate and necessary.

🔹 Best Practice in this case:
Add these problematic websites to the SSL Decryption Exclusion list.
This tells the firewall not to decrypt traffic to these domains/IPs, allowing users to access them while maintaining decryption for all other sites.

🔐 Note: While this reduces visibility for these specific sites, it is often necessary for compatibility and business continuity.

❌ Why the other options are incorrect:

A. Install the unsupported cipher into the firewall: You can’t install ciphers into Palo Alto firewalls. Cipher support is part of the system software.
B. Allow the firewall to block the sites to improve the security posture: This might increase security, but it can disrupt business if those sites are required (e.g., critical business apps).
D. Create a Security policy to allow access to those sites: A Security policy alone won’t help if decryption is still enforced and fails due to cipher mismatch. The session will still be blocked at the SSL Proxy layer.

🔍 Reference:

Palo Alto Networks – Decryption Exclusion
TechDocs – Configure SSL Decryption Exclusions

Explanation:

When a traffic log shows the application field as "not-applicable", it typically means the firewall never had the chance to inspect enough data to identify the application. This most often occurs when:

The firewall drops or denies the traffic very early — before the App-ID engine can analyze the session.
Common with implicit deny rules, or explicitly configured "deny" rules in the Security policy.

🔎 Additional Clarification of Other Options:

B. The TCP connection terminated without identifying any application data: This might result in the application showing as "incomplete", not "not-applicable".
C. There was not enough application data after the TCP connection was established: This results in "incomplete" or "insufficient-data", not "not-applicable".
D. The application is not a known Palo Alto Networks App-ID: If App-ID can't identify a custom or unknown app, it might show as "unknown-tcp", "unknown-udp", or a custom App-ID, not "not-applicable".

🔍 Reference:

Palo Alto Networks – Traffic Log Fields
Palo Alto Knowledge Base – Why Application is 'not-applicable'

Explanation:

The engineer should review the legal compliance regulations and acceptable usage policies with their leadership before implementing SSL Forward Proxy decryption for their organization. SSL Forward Proxy decryption allows the firewall to decrypt and inspect the traffic from internal users to external servers. This can raise privacy and legal concerns for the users and the organization.

Therefore, the engineer should ensure that the leadership is aware of the implications and benefits of SSL Forward Proxy decryption and that they have a clear policy for informing and obtaining consent from the users.

Option A is incorrect because browser-supported cipher documentation is not relevant for SSL Forward Proxy decryption. The firewall uses its own cipher suite to negotiate encryption with the external server, regardless of the browser settings.

Option B is incorrect because cipher documentation supported by the endpoint operating system is not relevant for SSL Forward Proxy decryption. The firewall uses its own cipher suite to negotiate encryption with the external server, regardless of the endpoint operating system.

Option C is incorrect because URL risk-based category distinctions are not relevant for SSL Forward Proxy decryption. The firewall can decrypt and inspect traffic based on any URL category, not just risk-based ones.

Explanation:

The two key exchange algorithms that consume the most resources when decrypting SSL traffic are ECDHE and DHE. These are both Diffie-Hellman based algorithms that enable perfect forward secrecy (PFS), which means that they generate a new and unique session key for each SSL/TLS session, and do not reuse any previous keys. This enhances the security of the encrypted communication, but also increases the computational cost and complexity of the key exchange process.

ECDHE stands for Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral, which uses elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) to generate the session key. DHE stands for Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral, which uses modular arithmetic to generate the session key. Both ECDHE and DHE require more CPU and memory resources than RSA, which is a non-PFS algorithm that uses public and private keys to encrypt and decrypt the session key.

References:
Key Exchange Algorithms, Best Practices for Enabling SSL Decryption, PCNSE Study Guide (page 60)

Detailed Explanation:

When a local override is applied on a firewall (modifying a Panorama-pushed configuration):

B. The modification will not be visible in Panorama.
Panorama does not automatically detect or display locally overridden values on the firewall.
The firewall retains its local changes, but Panorama still shows its original template configuration.

Why the Other Options Are Incorrect:

A. Panorama does not automatically flag templates as "out of sync" due to local overrides (manual review is required).
C. Both Panorama and the firewall CLI can revert overrides (Panorama is not the only method).
D. Panorama does not auto-update templates with locally overridden values (changes must be manually pushed from Panorama).

Best Practice:
Use "Force Template Values" in Panorama to eliminate local overrides and enforce centralized management.

Reference:
Panorama Local Overrides Documentation